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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
Stockholders' Consent for Sale of Realty
Section 20 of the Stock Corporation Law requires the consent of two-thirds
of the stockholders in a sale of substantially all the assets of the corporation not
made in the regular course of business. Past decisions hold that the regular course
of business is the business that the corporation was actually carrying on prior to
the sale and not what the corporate charter authorized. 7 In Eisen v. Post,8 when
the directors sold all of the corporate assets without the consent of its stockholders,
the corporation's actual business was an ultra vires activity. Although the sale was
authorized by the corporate charter the stockholders brought an action to set the
sale aside on the ground that section 20 was applicable. Relying on past decisions
the stockholders claimed that the sale was not made in the regular course of
business because the regular course of business was what the corporation actually
had been carrying on. The Court held that an ultra vires activity cannot be the
regular course of business under section 20 and therefore the charter must control.
In so holding the Court did not overrule the past decisions which make actual
business controlling but made the distinction that the actual activity carried on
in past cases was authorized.
The Court based its decision upon the theory that third persons who rely
on the charter of the corporation with which they deal should be protected.
however it refused to disavow the general rule and made the charter controlling
only where the actual business is ultra vires. Therefore outsiders still may not
rely upon the corporate charter. They must still find out which of the authorized
businesses are actually being carried on in order to protect themselves against
voidability. Since they cannot know the actual business to be ultra vires without
first finding what the actual business is, the holding of this case is of no protection
to them unless they have failed to exercise the usual care required to protect
themselves by investigating and the actual business turns out to be ultra vires.
The kind of protection thus afforded by the present case is a windfall and is not
required by reason or authority.
A more realistic basis for the holding is that since the stockholders can have
no legitimate interest in the continuation of an ultra vires business, there is no
reason to give them relief under section 20.
Authority of President to Commence Arbitration
The Court was again this term presented with the question of the power
7. In re Kunin, 306 N.Y. 967, 120 N.E.2d 228 (1954); Hodes v. 1299 Realty
Corp., 278 App. Div. 803, 104 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1951).
8. 3 N.Y.2d 518, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1957).
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of a corporate officer to institute legal action for his corporation.', In Paloma
Frocks, Inc. v. Shamokin Sportswear Corp.10 the corporation's president, under
the terms of a contract of his corporation, served a demand upon the other
contr-:tung party for arbitration of an alleged breach of contract without first
securing the approval of his board of directors, half of which represented the
other contracting parry and presumably would have opposed the action had it
been submitted to the Board. On this application for a stay of arbitration, held:
the president had the requisite authorir1 to institute the action.
1'
The power to do business, including corporate litigation, is vested primarily
in the board of directors.12 However, it is by now well settled that, in the absence
of an express proscription by the charter, by-laws, or board of directors, the
president has prima facie authority to initiate litigation.': This power is implied
by the rules of agency where the president has been given general management of
the corporate business and the litigation is a part of the general business of the
corporation.
14
Because the authority is not inherent in the office, it follows that the board
may revoke it at any time. Thus, in Sterling Industries v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.,"5
a 1949 decision, where the president had consulted the board and it, by a deadlock
vote, rejected the proposal to litigate, it was held that whatever implied authority
the president had previously possessed was taken from him by the board's
rejection and he could not later commence action on his own initiative. The
mere fact of deadlock by the board does not invest the president with power to
act since equal representation on the board is a valid means of control for
contending factions and since there was an adequate alternative remedy for the
president, to wit: a stockholder's derivative action initiated by him in his capacity
as stockholder.
9. The Court in the 1956 term found the necessary authority for a corpora-
tion's secretary-treasurer, who was the general manager of the business. See
Rothman and Schneider v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957) and
Note Power of Corporate Officers to Institute Litigation, 7 BUFFALO L. REv. 102
(1957).
10. 3 N.Y.2d 572, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958)..
11. Paloma Frocks Inc. v. Snamokin Sportswear Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 572, 170
N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
12. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAw §27; N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §60; Koral v. Savory,
276 N.Y. 215, 217, 11 N.E.2d 883, 884-885 (1937).
13. Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 263 N.Y. 6, 188 N.E. 138 (1933); 2
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §618 (Perm. ed., Rev. vol. 1954).
14. Ibid. See also Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman, supra, note L
Although there is little authority in New York, it would seem on principle that
the president has power to sue for the corporation where its interests demand
action to avoid Immediate or vital injury and the board of directors, acting in bad
faith, has refused authority. Recamier Mfg. Co. v. Seymour, 15 Daly 245, 5 N.Y.
Supp. 648 (1889); Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N. J. L. 604, 1 A.2d 204
(1938). (Such evidentiary facts were not present In Sterling Industries v. Ball
Bearing Pen Corp., infra, note 7, or in the instant case, supra, note 3.)
15. 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
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The Court distinguished Sterling from the instant case because in the latter
instance (1) the initiation of litigation was never submitted to the board for
approval and (2) demanding arbitration under the contract clause amounted
to no more than the routine performance of a contract, within the president's
general management authority; although the board could have expressly forbidden
submission of a particular disputes to arbitration, it had not done so.16
The distinction drawn seems somewhat fine. The inclusion of a general
arbitration clause in a contract should settle the form of remedy between the
contracting parties.17 However, the question whether to press a particular claim
involves policy considerations traditionally left to the business discretion of the
board of directors, subject to the director's fiduciary duty to shareholders.' 8 That
the proposed litigation is to be by arbitration rather than by adjudication should
not affect this.
The case seems to rest on the factual distinction that here the proposed
action was not submitted to the board and suggests that if a corporation general
managing officer, facing a deadlocked board, acts on his own initiative without
consulting the board, his action will be sustained even if he knew that he could
not have obtained approval from the board. This, it is submitted, is not in
keeping with the policy of the statute19 or the well-reasoned rationalia of the
Sterling decision.
20
Membership Corporations-Requirement for Membership Approval
Approval not having been obtained from the Supreme Court of a lease
entered into by a membership corporation as required by 'section 21 of the
Membership Corporation Law,21 this proceeding was brought by the lessee there-
under for its confirmation.22 The lease had been approved by the board bf
directors of the corporation with the requisite quorum present. However, the
evidence established that the scheme of the by-laws indicated an intent that every
decision of the organization, not purely ministerial in nature, be made by a
majority vote of the members. Thus, the lease was not validly entered into by
the corporation in the first place, and there was nothing for the Court to approve.
16. Paloma Frocks, Inc. v. Shamokin Sportswear Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 572,
170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
17. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT Art. 84.
18. Koral v. Savory, 276 N.Y. 215, 11 N.E. 883 (1937); Posts v. Buck's Stove
& Range Co., 200 Fed. 918 (8th Cir. 1912).
19. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §27.
20. Sterling Industries v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d
790 (1949).
21. "No sale or mortgage . . . of real property within the state, or lease
thereof for more than five years, shall be made without leave of the supreme
court in a judicial district in which some of the property is located, or the county
court of the county wherein the property is wholly or partly situated .... If [a
lease has been entered into without approval], the court ... may confirm such...
lease, subject to the intervening rights, if any, of subsequent bona fide purchasers
and mortgages of record."
22. In re Trapasso Oldsmobile, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 133, 173 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1958).
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